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IN THIS NOTE THE AUTHORS STUDY DIFFERENT METHODS OF AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES MET ON THE OCCASION OF ELECTIONS. THROUGH A SIMPLE GEOMETRICAL REPRESENTATION, THEY ANALYSE SEVERAL OF THEIR PROPERTIES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE LINKED TO ARROW'S THEOREM FOR ORDINAL RANKINGS; THEY PURSUE THIS DISCUSSION IN THE CASE OF CARDINAL RANKINGS, THE QUALITIES OF WHICH CONVINCE US OF THE USEFULNESS OF EXPERIENCING THEIR INTRODUCTION IN REAL BALLOTS.

Comparative political analysis at the macro-level of political systems can reduce the inevitably high complexity of such comparisons by the systematic matching or constrasting of cases, depending on the particular problem. Such "most similar systems" or "most different systems" designs, in Przeworski & Teune's terminology, thus constitute one of the major ways out of the usual "small N - many variables" dilemma. This paper proposes a detailed and comprehensive method to establish such similarities and dissimilarities in a systematic and at all stages transparent way. The examples chosen refer to an analysis of the conditions of survival or breakdown of democratic systems in the inter-war period in Europe. (European Journal of Political Research / AuD)

ABSTRACTThe problem of fair representation is studied in the case of cleavage according to one or two criteria. In the latter case we show that with minimal requirements of equity, a solution exists only if the two criteria are binary. This might explain an observed tendency to political bipolarization.

A formal mathematical model is used to explore the problem of fair representation in the case of cleavage according to one or two criteria. In two-criterion situations, a solution exists that meets minimal equity requirements only if the two criteria are binary. This may explain an observed tendency to political bipolarization. 5 Tables, 8 References. Modified HA